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I. INTRODUCTION
Undercover agents and sting operations are utilized as a means to
effectively identify criminals and enforce the law.' The deception and
inducement often involved in undercover operations is not in itself for-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Kelly Orlando, B.A., 2001, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; J.D. expected May
2004, University of Nebraska College of Law. Thanks to Dottie, Adam, and Brian
for putting up with me for the past three years. I made it!
1. See Ian J. McLoughlin, The Meaning of Predisposition in Practice, 79 B.U. L. REV
1067, 1067 (1999).
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bidden,2 but using law enforcement officials to induce an otherwise
law-abiding citizen to commit a crime he or she would not have com-
mitted absent the government operation will often raise the issue of
whether the defendant was entrapped.3 The entrapment defense is an
affirmative defense asserted by individuals who, instead of challeng-
ing the existence of the elements which constitute the crime charged,
alternatively argue that the methods of inducement used were such
that absent government involvement, the individual would never have
committed the crime.4 There are two elements involved in the asser-
tion of the entrapment defense: inducement and predisposition. 5 The
first element of the entrapment defense, inducement, places the bur-
den of proof on the defendant to demonstrate that inducement oc-
curred. If the defendant is successful in carrying its burden, the
second element, predisposition, shifts the burden to the prosecution
and requires it to prove that the individual charged was predisposed
to commit the crime.6
The element of inducement is relatively easy to establish when un-
dercover operations are involved,7 and in order to avoid wasting time
in litigation, the government may not even challenge that inducement
occurred.8 Consequently, the element of predisposition is generally
the primary - if not the exclusive - focus when the entrapment de-
fense is raised.9
2. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932).
3. See 21 AMJuR 2D, Criminal Law § 202 (1981).
4. "Entrapment is an affirmative or positive defense that must be raised by the de-
fendant." 21 AMJuR 2D, Criminal Law § 203 (1981).
5. See Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988) (stating that "a valid en-
trapment defense has two related elements: government inducement of the
crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the
criminal conduct,"); J. Gregory Deis, Economics, Causation, and the Entrapment
Defense, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1221 (2001) (pointing out that federal courts
"continue to approach the entrapment defense under the two-step approach of
inducement and predisposition.")
6. In Matthews, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 886, the Court stated that "the
[Supreme] Court has consistently adhered to the view ... that a valid entrap-
ment defense has two related elements: government inducement of the crime,
and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in criminal
conduct."
7. See Poehlman v. United States, 217 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 2000) (referring to
Supreme Court cases that have demonstrated inducement can be demonstrated
by "very subtle" governmental pressure); State v. Canaday, 263 Neb. 566, 582,
641 N.W.2d 13, 26 (Neb. 2002) (recognizing the low burden placed on the defen-
dant with respect to satisfying the inducement element and pointing out that this
burden is met by bringing forth only a "mere scintilla" of evidence).
8. See Poehlman, 217 F.3d at 701 (referring to a previously decided Supreme Court
case in which the government conceded inducement).
9. "Once government instigation is shown, the ultimate question is whether the in-
ducement by the officers or the defendant's own predisposition caused the crimi-
nal conduct." 21 AMJuR 2D, Criminal Law § 205 (1981).
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Predisposition is most simply defined as a "readiness and willing-
ness" to commit the crime charged.1 0 The use of such a broad defini-
tion could plausibly result in the predispositional element being easy
to establish, especially when the question is being asked of a person
who has admitted committing a crime. However, determining
whether the prosecution has successfully carried its burden of proof
with respect to establishing predisposition has generated substantial
controversy. 11
Recently the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed a decision by
the Douglas County District Court convicting the defendant and re-
jecting his attempted assertion of the entrapment defense.12 Ronald
Canaday was charged with conspiracy to commit sexual assault on a
child after he participated in written correspondence and telephone
conversations with an undercover agent posing as a single mother.1
3
The path Canaday took through the courts, beginning with the district
court rejecting the entrapment defense and culminating (for now) in
reversal by the Nebraska Supreme Court, demonstrates the need to
come to some resolution on the controversial element of
predisposition.
Although Canaday does not claim on its face to constitute any sig-
nificant shift in the way the entrapment defense is treated in Ne-
braska, a close examination of the case in light of the opinions from
the Supreme Court and other jurisdictions reveals that Canaday may
constitute a movement toward requiring that the prosecution prove
the presence of positional predisposition in order to meet its burden
when the entrapment defense has been asserted. If the suggestion
that the Nebraska Supreme Court is making the shift toward requir-
ing the prosecution to prove positional predisposition is correct, the
court should not stop at an unstated requirement. Instead, the court
should take what it implicitly did in Canaday and make it an explicit
requirement at its first opportunity.
This Note will examine the way the entrapment defense has been
treated across jurisdictions. Specifically, this Note argues that the
Canaday decision may show that the Nebraska Supreme Court has
adopted the view taken by the United States Supreme Court and vari-
ous other jurisdictions in requiring the prosecution to demonstrate po-
sitional predisposition if it is to successfully defeat an assertion of the
entrapment defense. The Background section will first present infor-
10. See McLoughlin, supra note 1, at 1067 (stating that jury instructions generally
define predisposition in this way).
11. "Courts disagree over whether the predisposition element requires that the gov-
ernment prove the defendant was in a position to commit the crime, even absent
governmental involvement." Id. at 1068 (emphasis added).
12. See State v. Canaday, 263 Neb. 566, 588, 641 N.W.2d 13, 30 (2002).
13. See id. at 568, 641 N.W. 2d at 17.
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mation necessary to understand the elements and operation of the en-
trapment defense, and more specifically, the importance of the
element of predisposition. This section will then trace the history of
how the United States Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals have addressed the element of predisposition. This history
will provide an illustration suggesting that these jurisdictions are
making a shift toward requiring a showing of positional predisposition
as part of the prosecution's burden when attempting to defeat an as-
sertion of the entrapment defense. The Analysis section will focus on
how this shift toward requiring a showing of positional predisposition
has also been recognized by the Nebraska Supreme Court and the im-
portant implications this shift will have upon not only the burden of
the prosecution, but also on the way that undercover operations are
designed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Canady Case
On November 4, 1999, the Douglas County District Court in Ne-
braska convicted Ronald Canaday of conspiracy to commit first degree
sexual assault on a child.14 Judge John D. Hartigan, Jr. acted as the
trier of fact and entered an order sentencing Ronald Canaday to 5
years probation.15 Canaday appealed, and as the sole assignment of
error, the defense claimed that the State "failed to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the Defendant had not been entrapped, accord-
ingly, there was insufficient evidence to find the Defendant guilty of
the crime convicted."1 6 On March 29, 2002, the Nebraska Supreme
Court reversed the conviction, holding that it was "clearly erroneous
to conclude from this record that the State disproved entrapment be-
yond a reasonable doubt."i 7 Specifically, with respect to the element
of predisposition, the court stated that "there [was] no evidence upon
which a rational finder of fact could conclude that Canaday had a pre-
disposition to commit the offense with which he was charged prior to
and independent of the State's inducement."' 8
The case against Canaday developed during an undercover sting
operation conducted by the Omaha Police Department.1 9 The opera-
tion was designed to identify those individuals with a sexual interest
14. See id.
15. See id.; Appellant's Brief at 1, State v. Canaday, 263 Neb. 566, 641 N.W.2d 13
(2002) (No. A-01-0150).
16. Appellant's Brief at 2, Canaday (No. A-01-0150).
17. State v. Canaday, 263 Neb. 566, 589, 641 N.W.2d 13, 30 (2002).
18. Id.
19. See id. at 568, 641 N.W.2d at 17.
2004]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
in children and willingness to make sexual contact with children.2O
Canday responded to a 1997 advertisement placed in an adult maga-
zine21 that stated: "Lisa, pob 1829 Council Bluffs, Iowa 51502. Single
mom looking for right man who likes kids and understands needs!"2
2
According to the testimony of Officer Steven Henthorn, the officer
who corresponded with Canaday and posed as "Lisa," the advertise-
ment was vague and open to interpretation with respect to the men-
tioning of children.2 3 Canaday responded on August 10, 1998 with a
handwritten letter which included a physical description of himself, a
request for a physical description of Lisa, and an indication that he
would like to hear from Lisa soon. In this letter, there was no refer-
ence to children. 24
Henthorn testified that there was nothing of significance in
Canaday's first letter to Lisa,2 5 but that the next letter to Canaday
referring to "special education" for Lisa's "sweethearts" was drafted
with the specific purpose of reaching only those who have a sexual
interest in children. 2 6 In the correspondence that followed, Canday
expressed confusion with regard to what Lisa stated she was looking
for in her letter.27 In the third letter written to Canaday, Henthorn
testified the language clearly conveyed that Lisa's intention was to
find someone who was willing to become sexually involved with her
children.28
It was not until a letter written on October 21, 1998 that Canaday
made any inquiry into whether the "special education" Lisa referred to
in her letters involved sex.2 9 However, letters written to Lisa on No-
vember 18, 1998 and December 4, 1998 revealed continued uncer-
tainty on the part of Canaday.3O Henthorn testified that despite the
continued questions, both letters were significant because in them
20. See Appellant's Brief at 2, Canaday (No. A-01-0150).
21. The ad was placed in a magazine with "strong sexual content," State v. Canaday,
263 Neb. at 568, 641 N.W.2d at 17, but was characterized as an "adult swinging
magazine for adult couples wanting to engage in sexual activity." Appellant's
Brief at 3, Canaday (No. A-01-0150).
22. State v. Canaday, 263 Neb. 566, 569, 641 N.W.2d 13, 17 (2002).
23. See id. at 568-69, 641 N.W.2d at 17.
24. See id. at 569, 641 N.W.2d at 17; Appellant's Brief at 4, Canaday (No. A-01-0150).
25. See Canaday, 263 Neb. at 569, 641 N.W.2d at 17.
26. Id. at 569-70, 641 N.W. 2d at 18; Appellant's Brief at 4, Canaday (No. A-01-0150).
27. Canaday's confusion is illustrated by what he wrote: "[Tiell me what you are look-
ing for? A friend? A mate? A partner? A husband? Your letter doesn't specify.
Lisa, I'm trying to understand but there are a lot of questions I have to ask to
help me understand. I hope you don't mind?" Appellant's Brief at 4-5, Canaday
(No. A-01-0150).
28. State v. Canaday, 263 Neb. 566, 570, 641 N.W.2d 13, 18 (2002).
29. See Appellant's Brief at 6, Canaday (No. A-01-0150).
30. In this letter, Canaday wrote: "Are you looking for a male partner? As a teacher
along with you to teach your children about love and sex? ... See, if you could
answer these questions it would help my [sic] know what would be expected of
[Vol. 82:866
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Canaday expressed comfort with and an interest in having sex with
Lisa's children.3
1
In a letter written on December 14, 1998, Lisa stated that she was
looking for something only for her children and that anything between
Canaday and herself would upset the children.3 2 On January 4, 1999,
Lisa wrote to Canaday and stated that the children "think hands-on
teaching is best. You can use the bedroom or wherever you're comfort-
able."3 3 In the last letter written to Lisa, Canaday stated: "You asked
- would I be comfortable teaching your children? It would be new for
me but I think I could be comfortable with it if they are comfortable
with me."3
4
On January 20, 1999, a woman officer posed as Lisa and made a
telephone call to Canaday in which she again stated that she was only
looking for a teacher for her children. 3 5 In this recorded conversation,
Canaday told Lisa that he was "new at this" and that he had "never
tried it" before.3 6 During this conversation, Lisa asked for a written
lesson plan and Canaday responded to the request by sending a letter
which indicated that he would be involved in sexual contact, and even-
tually sexual intercourse, with the children.3 7 In another telephone
conversation, Lisa asked Canaday if he had any tapes with "children
learning" and Canaday said that the only tapes he had involved
adults.38 In the final telephone conversation between Lisa and
Canaday, they agreed on a time and place to meet and Canaday again
"stated that he had never taught sex to children before and, when
questioned by Lisa, further stated that he had never even thought
about it before."39
On February 5, 1999, Canaday met a woman officer, who was pos-
ing as Lisa, in person and after a short conversation, he was ar-
rested.40 Following a background check and search of Canaday's
home, no evidence of a sexual interest in children was found. 4 1 How-
ever, Canday consented to a search of his car at the hotel where of-
ficers discovered a bottle of baby oil, a box of unopened condoms, and a
me! I'd like to know something without having to guess!!" Appellant's Brief at 8-
9, Canaday (No. A-01-0150).
31. Canaday, 263 Neb. at 571-72, 641 N.W.2d at 19.
32. See id. at 572, 641 N.W.2d at 19.
33. Appellant's Brief at 9-10, Canaday (No. A-01-0150).
34. Id. at 10.
35. See State v. Canaday, 263 Neb. 566, 574, 641 N.W.2d 13, 20-21 (2002).
36. Id. at 574, 641 N.W.2d at 21.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 575, 641 N.W.2d at 21.
39. Id. at 576, 641 N.W.2d at 22.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 577, 641 N.W.2d at 23.
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Polaroid camera. 42 Canaday denied that any of these things were go-
ing to be used with Lisa's children.43
At trial Canaday testified that he "responded to the magazine in
order to meet Lisa, not with the intention of having sex with chil-
dren."44 Additionally, Canaday testified that although he did convey
to Lisa he would have sex with her children, he never thought she was
serious and he only agreed to Lisa's requests in order to meet Lisa
herself.45 Despite Canaday's testimony, the district court found
Canaday guilty and indicated that the items found in his car during
the search at the hotel "strongly influenced" their decision.46
Canaday appealed the decision of the district court and on March
29, 2002, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed his conviction.47 Af-
ter a brief discussion of the general principles of the entrapment de-
fense and the crime of conspiracy,48 the court stated that "[t]he only
substantive issue presented in this appeal is whether the district
court erred in rejecting Canaday's entrapment defense."49
Since the district court did not clearly indicate why Canaday's en-
trapment defense was rejected, 50 the Nebraska Supreme Court had to
determine whether the rejection resulted from one of two alternative
possibilities. The district court must have decided either that (1)
there was an absence of inducement by the government or (2) if there
was inducement, Canaday was predisposed to commit the crime. 51 Af-
ter stating that "[iinducement consists of an opportunity plus some-
thing else,"52 the court stated that "something else" can include things
such as "excessive pressure by the government upon the defendant or
the government's taking advantage of an alternative, noncriminal
type of motive . . . . "53 The court determined that inducement oc-
curred because "the government materially affected the normal bal-
ance between risks and rewards" when it made the initial references
42. See id.




47. See State v. Canady, 263 Neb. 566, 589, 641 N.W.2d 13, 30 (2002).
48. See id. at 580-81, 641 N.W.2d at 25 (explaining the unilateral approach to the
agreement element of conspiracy requires only that the defendant agree with an-
other person, even if the person is an agent who is feigning agreement). The
unilateral approach is clearly necessary in cases like Canaday, where undercover
operations require an agent to pose as a co-conspirator.
49. Id. at 581, 641 N.W.2d at 25.
50. See id. at 582, 641 N.W.2d at 26.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 583, 641 N.W.2d at 26.
53. Id. at 585, 641 N.W.2d at 28.
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to children and continued correspondence from Lisa that "played on
his emotions and desires" to continue his relationship with her.54
Following the determination that Canaday was induced, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court then determined that there was not enough
evidence to conclude that Canaday was predisposed to commit the
crime charged. 5 5 The court stated that in order to determine that a
defendant was predisposed, the evidence of predisposition must be in-
dependent and not a product of the inducement by the government. 56
Upon reversal, the court rejected the State's argument that predispo-
sition was demonstrated by the mere fact that Canaday responded to
the advertisement placed by the police department and focused in-
stead on the fact that Canaday's original letter and a search of his
home revealed no evidence suggesting he had any interest in sex with
children.57
B. The Defense - Entrapment Generally
Entrapment is an affirmative defense58 that developed to protect
those individuals who would likely not have committed a crime had
the government or law enforcement not designed and executed a plan
which unrealistically disrupted the normal course of their lives and
provided opportunities that otherwise would not have been encoun-
tered.5 9 Since the entrapment defense is a judicially and not constitu-
tionally created defense, 60 each court is free to establish its own
version of the defense and can adopt its own set of standards.61 Left
with this freedom, the defense has come to take on two different forms
that differ slightly with respect to the test employed by the courts in
determining whether the defense is proper. 62 The test adopted by the
54. Id.
55. See id. at 589, 641 N.W.2d at 30.
56. See id. at 585, 641 N.W.2d at 28.
57. See id. at 588-589, 641 N.W.2d at 30.
58. See Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988) (explaining that the en-
trapment defense is an affirmative defense because it would be "inconsistent" for
a defendant to challenge the elements of the crime committed, but claim at the
same time that he was entrapped into committing the crime); 21 AMJuR 2D,
Criminal Law § 203 (1981) (characterizing the entrapment defense as an affirma-
tive defense).
59. [TIhe entrapment defense is the judicial instrument created to address [the] pos-
sibility of government-manufactured crime." Dies, supra note 5, at 1207.
60. See 21 AMJuR 2D, Criminal Law § 203 (1981) (stating that entrapment was not
developed through constitutional means, yet it has been "universally accepted" by
judicial decision or legislation in the states).
61. See id. (pointing out that Congress can address entrapment for purposes of fed-
eral law, and state courts are "free to select [their] own standards for the
defense").
62. See generally 21 AmJUR 2D, Criminal Law §§ 205, 206 (1981) (explaining and
comparing the subjective and objective tests, respectively).
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majority of state courts and the majority of the justices on the Su-
preme Court of the United States has been termed the "subjective" or
the "origin of intent" test while a minority of the state courts and a
minority of the Supreme Court justices prefer the "objective" test.6 3
Since Nebraska has adopted the majority test, the subjective or "origin
of intent" test,64 this Note will focus on entrapment as it is character-
ized by this test.
C. Predispositional Element - The Ultimate Focus
Under the subjective test, a successful entrapment defense consists
of two related, yet distinct elements: (1) inducement by the govern-
ment to commit the crime charged and (2) a lack of predisposition on
the part of the charged defendant.65 When the subjective test of en-
trapment is employed, the burden of proof shifts away from the defen-
dant as soon as he produces only a little more than a "mere scintilla"
of evidence to demonstrate government inducement.66 If the defen-
dant is successful in proving inducement, the burden shifts to the
prosecution and it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defen-
dant was predisposed. 67 Due to the relative ease with which a defen-
dant can establish the element of inducement, when the entrapment
defense is asserted the focus is almost exclusively on the element of
predisposition.6S
With respect to undercover government operations, the Supreme
Court has pointed out that "[tihe appropriate object of this permitted
activity, frequently essential to the enforcement of the law, is to reveal
the criminal design . . . the illegal conspiracy, or other offenses, and
thus to disclose the would-be violators of the law."6 9 This language is
important because it makes clear the Supreme Court's desire to en-
sure that when government operations are executed, only those indi-
viduals who would have violated the law absent any government
inducement, in other words, those who were predisposed, are en-
snared in the net of inducement.
63. 21 AMJuR 2D, Criminal Law § 205 (1981) (calling the subjective test the "gener-
ally accepted" test); see also Deis, supra note 5 (pointing out that the preferred
test is the subjective test).
64. See State v. Swenson, 217 Neb. 820, 823, 352 N.W.2d 149, 153 (1984) (stating
that "Nebraska has adopted the 'origin of intent' test").
65. According to the Supreme Court of the United States, "a valid entrapment de-
fense has two related elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack
of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in criminal conduct."
Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); see also Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); State v. Swenson, 217 Neb. 820, 352 N.W.2d 149
(1984).
66. State v. Canaday, 263 Neb. 566, 582, 641 N.W.2d 13, 26 (2002).
67. See id. (explaining the shifting burden).
68. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
69. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441-42 (emphasis added).
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D. The Problem of Assessing Predisposition - Recognition
by the Courts
It may seem logical to assert that government operations should
focus only on predisposed individuals and not those who succumb to
levels and types of inducement they would be unlikely to encounter
during their lifetime absent any fabricated situation. Yet, once a
crime has been committed and an individual has been accused, it is
difficult to deny that any attempt to assess the disposition of the ac-
cused prior to the government inducement has a high risk of being
tainted by the existence of the charges asserted against him or her.
Traditionally, the prosecution has focused on evidence regarding
the mental state of the defendant to demonstrate the requisite predis-
position. 70 However, recent cases recognize the problem of pre-in-
ducement evidence being tainted by post-inducement accusations.
7 1
The concept of positional predisposition, explained most explicitly in
United States v. Hollingsworth,72 would require the prosecution's pre-
disposition case to include not only an examination of evidence regard-
ing the mental state of the accused, but also an examination of
evidence regarding the resources available to the accused prior to the
government involvement.73
Since states are free to adopt their own versions of the entrapment
defense,7 4 the treatment of what constitutes sufficient predisposition
such that it will strip the defendant of the protection provided by the
entrapment defense varies across different jurisdictions. This section
focuses on the different ways the element of predisposition has been
treated by the United States Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The views of these jurisdictions are the most rele-
vant here not only because Canaday looked primarily to the United
States Supreme Court for guidance in its assessment of predisposi-
tion,75 but also because of the power of precedent that these jurisdic-
tions exert over the Nebraska Supreme Court.
70. Until recently, most cases have suggested that the prosecution needs only to
demonstrate that the defendant was "psychologically prepared" to meet their bur-
den. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1198 (7th Cir. 1994).
71. See generally United States v. Sherman, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells, 287 U.S.
435 (1932); United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994).
72. 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994).
73. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200 (stating that "[piredisposition is not a purely
mental state," and that the prosecution's burden under the positional predisposi-
tion concept requires a showing that the defendant was "so situated by reason of
previous training or experience or occupation or acquaintances" that he would
have had the ability and resources to commit the crime absent government
involvement).
74. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
75. Although the Canaday opinion cites to several cases throughout, it primarily fo-
cuses on Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 112 S.Ct. 1535 (1992), when
20041
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In the following cases, the court overturned a conviction after de-
termining that the prosecution did not sufficiently carry its burden of
proving predisposition.76 The opinions from these decisions reveal
that the courts are not willing to allow the entrapment defense to fail
if the evidence of predisposition is based solely on the mental state of
the defendant. Almost invariably, the focus of the court's decision to
overturn is on the lack of evidence suggesting that, prior to govern-
ment involvement, the defendant possessed the resources required to
commit the crime. 7 7
1. United States Supreme Court
In Sorrells v. United States,7 8 the Supreme Court reversed a con-
viction of a defendant who was charged with possession of intoxicating
liquor following a transaction involving an undercover government
agent. 7 9 Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, the defendant's at-
tempted assertion of the entrapment defense was rejected by the trial
court, a ruling that was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.8 0 Upon reversal, the Supreme Court stated that because the
government failed to effectively present evidence suggesting that the
defendant had "ever possessed or sold any intoxicating liquor prior to
the transaction in question,"8 1 the entrapment defense was available
to the defendant and refusal of the lower court to submit the issue of
entrapment to the jury constituted reversible error.8 2
Following Sorrells, the Supreme Court heard the case of Sherman
v. United States,8 3 where the Court again reversed a conviction in
which the lower court rejected the defendant's attempted assertion of
the entrapment defense.8 4 The Sherman opinion revealed that the
Court had become concerned with drawing a line between "the trap for
the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."85 The
Court refused to side with the government's position that two prior
convictions for similar crimes were sufficient to demonstrate predispo-
addressing the issue of predisposition. See State v. Canaday, 263 Neb. 566, 586-
87, 641 N.W.2d 13, 29 (2002).
76. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (refusing to uphold a
conviction where the prosecution was not able to sufficiently demonstrate the de-
fendant demonstrated a "readiness" to commit the crime charged).
77. See this section and the reasons stated for overturning convictions (addressed
individually by case).
78. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
79. See id. at 438.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 441.
82. See id. at 452.
83. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
84. See id. at 369.
85. See id. at 372.
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sition.86 Apparently, the Court felt that evidence of previous convic-
tions is not necessarily enough to say that the defendant has fallen in
the category of the "unwary criminal."8 7
In Jacobson v. United States,8 8 a recent Supreme Court case that
originated in Nebraska, the Court addressed the predisposition ele-
ment of the entrapment defense and once again reversed a defendant's
conviction after reasoning that the defendant should have been al-
lowed to assert the entrapment defense.8 9 The defendant in this case
was charged with receiving child pornography following two and one-
half years of government inducement. 90 The Supreme Court reversed
the lower court, placing importance on the fact that the defendant did
not himself initiate any correspondence and that prior to the govern-
ment operation there was no evidence that the defendant had ever
possessed or expressed an interest in child pornography.9 1 Jacobson
was heavily relied upon in Canaday with respect to the element of
predisposition. 92
In the earlier cases of Sorrells and Sherman, the Court demon-
strated that, although historically the "critical component" of the
predispositional element had been the assessment of the defendant's
state of mind, 93 the Court was not willing to allow the government to
prevail in a case based purely on evidence of past behavior or a show-
ing of mental preparedness.94 Subsequently, the Court made it clear
in Jacobson that the government will not prevail in their attempt to
establish predisposition absent a showing that prior to any govern-
ment contact the defendant possessed at least some of the physical
materials and resources needed to commit the crime.
With respect to exactly what kind of evidence is sufficient to defeat
the entrapment defense, the Supreme Court expressly held that more
is required than mere submission to persistent government induce-
86. Specifically, the Court stated that "a nine-year-old sales conviction and a five-
year-old sales conviction are insufficient" to show a "readiness" to sell drugs at
the time the agent approached him. Id. at 375.
87. Id. at 372.
88. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
89. See id. at 542.
90. See id. at 543.
91. See id. at 546-47.
92. See State v. Canaday, 263 Neb. 566, 641 N.W.2d 13 (2002) (citing to Jacobson
repeatedly in the section addressing the element of predisposition). In addition to
relying on Jacobson with respect to the predisposition issue, Canaday also cites
to Jacobson for general statements regarding the purpose of the entrapment de-
fense. For example, in the conclusion of the Canaday opinion, the court cites to a
portion of Jacobson that quotes Sherman and states: "The defense of entrapment
serves to prevent law enforcement agencies from overstepping the 'line between
setting a trap for the "unwary innocent" and the "unwary criminal."" Id. at 589,
641 N.W.2d at 30.
93. See McLoughlin, supra note 1, at 1072 (1999),
94. See supra notes 82, 83, 87, 88, and accompanying text.
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ment,95 or evidence of a few prior convictions for similar crimes. 96 Ad-
ditionally, the Court emphasized the importance of focusing on the
disposition of the defendant prior to any contact by government offi-
cials.97 This seems to imply that any evidence gathered after the con-
tact has occurred will be more susceptible to a claim by the defense
that the evidence is not necessarily suggestive of predisposition. In-
deed, a trace through the opinions reveals the Court is unwilling to
reject the entrapment defense when the prosecution fails to show that
the defendant possessed the resources required to commit the crime
charged prior to the government involvement.98
2. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: United States v. Jacobson
The Eighth Circuit decision to convict the defendant in United
States v. Jacobson,99 was overturned by the Supreme Court.10 0 Since
the Supreme Court overturned the Eighth Circuit decision in Jacob-
son based primarily on a determination that there was insufficient ev-
idence of predisposition, lOl it may lead one to believe that the Eighth
Circuit holds a view of the predisposition element that is markedly
different from that of the Supreme Court. However, an early Eighth
Circuit opinion reveals that this jurisdiction does not necessarily hold
a view so different from that of the Supreme Court. In Butts v. United
States,l0 2 the Eighth Circuit refused to uphold a conviction after de-
termining the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence of pre-
disposition. The court stated that
when the accused has never committed such an offense as that charged
against him ... and never conceived any intention of committing the offense
95. Upon reversal of the Eighth Circuit decision in Jacobson, the Supreme Court
stated:
Had the agents in this case simply offered [the defendant] the opportu-
nity to order child pornography through the mails, and [the defendant]
... had promptly availed himself of this criminal opportunity, it is un-
likely that his entrapment defense would have warranted a jury instruc-
tion. But that is not what happened here. By the time [the defendant]
finally placed his order, he had already been the target of 26 months of
repeated mailings and communications from Government agents and fic-
titious organizations.
Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992).
96. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 374-76 (1958).
97. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992) (emphasizing that
"the sole issue is whether the Government carried its burden of proving that peti-
tioner was predisposed to violate the law before the Government intervened) (em-
phasis in original).
98. In both opinions, the Court placed importance on the fact that searches of the
homes of the defendants revealed no materials (intoxicating liquor in Sorrells,
child pornography magazines in Jacobson) needed to commit the crimes charged.
99. 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990).
100. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542 (tracing the procedural history of Jacobson).
101. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
102. 273 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1921).
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prosecuted... and had not the means to do so, the fact that the officers of the
government incited... him to commit the offense charged.., is and ought to
be fatal to the prosecution.,
0 3
Although it remains to be seen whether the Eighth Circuit will pay
heed to the Supreme Court's disfavor of its treatment of the predispo-
sition element in the Jacobson opinion, the language of the more re-
cent Eighth Circuit opinions reveal that the Eight Circuit might be
more receptive to the prosecution's case if they can present evidence
that the accused possessed the resources required to commit the crime
prior to the government involvement.104 In addition, other jurisdic-
tions, including the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, have also recognized
the problem of post-accusation assessments of predisposition.105 The
view taken by these courts is addressed in the analysis section of this
Note.
E. Jacobson as Signaling a Shift - Introducing a
Requirement of Positional Predisposition
The Jacobson opinion was the first time the Court explicitly stated
that in order for the prosecution to meet their burden of demonstrat-
ing predisposition, it must prove disposition "prior to first being ap-
proached by Government agents.106 Although this "prior to"
requirement may appear to be no more than an articulated statement
of what both Sorrells and Sherman determined implicitly, in her dis-
sent, Justice O'Connor stated: "I believe the Court ... redefines 'pre-
disposition,' and introduces a new requirement that Government sting
operations have a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before con-
tacting a suspect." 107 This approach, requiring that the prosecution
demonstrate the defendant was in a position to commit the crime, has
been termed "positional predisposition."1os
Although the Jacobson opinion does not purport to explicitly adopt
any significant shift in the treatment of the entrapment defense, other
courts and scholars analyzing the opinion have agreed with Justice
O'Connor in her view that Jacobson did indeed signal a change in how
the element of predisposition should be defined and demonstrated. 109
103. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 215 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2000) (requiring that
consideration of predisposition include an examination of the defendant's per-
sonal background, and refusing to determine that evidence of prior convictions
alone were sufficient to demonstrate predisposition).
105. See United States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994).
106. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
107. Id. at 556 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108. See McLoughlin, supra note 1, at 1073.
109. In a lengthy assessment of the Jacobson decision, Judge Posner, a Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals Judge, pointed out that "it is not unusual for a court to
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According to one assessment of the Jacobson opinion, it was said that
it should be viewed as actually "demand[ing]" a positional predisposi-
tion requirement. 1 10
Traditionally, the prosecution has been able to defeat an assertion
of the entrapment defense by demonstrating that the defendant pos-
sessed a mental state suggesting predisposition to commit the
crime.11 Specifically, Jacobson has been interpreted as requiring the
prosecution to demonstrate that, in addition to a mental state sug-
gesting a predisposition, a successful demonstration of predisposition
must include a showing that the defendant also had access to the re-
sources that were required to commit the crime charged prior to the
government involvement.112 Ultimately, it appears that
the [Supreme] Court clarified the meaning of predisposition. Predisposition is
not a purely mental state . . . . It has positional as well as dispositional
force.... The defendant must be so situated by reason of previous training or
experience or occupation or acquaintances that it is likely that if the govern-
ment had not induced him to commit the crime [someone else would have done
so.] 113
The analyses characterizing Jacobson as signaling a shift toward
requiring positional predisposition are important in assessing the po-
sition of the Nebraska Supreme Court. This is true not only because
the Supreme Court essentially told the Nebraska Supreme Court that
its treatment of the entrapment defense in Jacobson constituted re-
versible error, 114 but also because the Canaday decision uses the Su-
preme Court opinion from Jacobson to explain its treatment of the
defense.115
III. ANALYSIS
Although Canaday, like Jacobson, does not expressly claim to con-
stitute any significant shift in the way the entrapment defense is
change the law without emphasizing its departures from or reinterpretation of
precedent," and that Jacobson did indeed signal a shift. United States v. Hol-
lingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1198.
110. McLoughlin, supra note 1, at 1074.
111. With respect to the direction toward which courts were drifting prior to the
Jacobson decision, it had been said that "the defense of entrapment must fail in
any case in which the defendant is 'willing,' in the sense of being psychologically
prepared." Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1198.
112. Hollingsworth points out that if the Jacobson court had agreed with precedent
(that a mental state was all that was required to demonstrate predisposition),
then the Supreme Court would have upheld the conviction. Id. at 1199.
113. Id. at 1200.
114. The Supreme Court decision overturning Jacobson's conviction meant that both
the United States District Court's initial conviction and the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion to affirm, see Jacobson, 503 U.S. 540, 542 (tracing the procedural history of
Jacobson), constituted reversible error.




treated in Nebraska, an examination of opinions from other jurisdic-
tions reveals that Canaday may constitute a movement toward the
path taken by the Supreme Court in requiring the prosecution's bur-
den to include a demonstration of positional predisposition. If
Canaday indeed signals a shift in the way the Nebraska Supreme
Court will treat the prosecution's burden in cases where the entrap-
ment defense is raised, the court should take its first opportunity to
make this requirement explicit. Although making the requirement of
positional predisposition explicit might appear to constitute a signifi-
cant change, the move would not be unsupported or entirely
unprecedented. 116
It appears that in order to comport with public policy and the stan-
dards for law enforcement, 11 7 and in an attempt to avoid the stigma
that attaches to individuals accused of a crime regardless of whether
the accusation results in conviction, 118 at least two related shifts in
the process of identifying and prosecuting targets of government oper-
ations have gained recognition by the courts. The primary shift is the
move toward making positional predisposition a required part of the
prosecution's burden when the defense of entrapment is asserted. The
related shift is a movement toward ensuring that undercover opera-
tions are more carefully designed to target a more identifiable target
group. The Canaday opinion signals that the Nebraska Supreme
Court is beginning to recognize the need for these shifts as well and is
taking the necessary steps to ensure that these shifts are put in
motion.
116. Although making the positional predisposition requirement explicit may appear
to constitute an even larger change than Canaday, if the suggestion that
Canaday constitutes a shift is correct, then explicitly requiring positional predis-
position only takes the step of making clear what was implicitly required anyway.
Making the requirement explicit would not be entirely unprecedented, as Judge
Posner of the Seventh Circuit has already asserted that he believes positional
predisposition is required in the wake of Jacobson. See McLoughlin, supra note
1, at 1073-74. Consequently, it would seem the Seventh Circuit would require a
showing of positional predisposition in the future, and would likely do so
expressly.
117. In Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1921), the court identified the under-
lying principles of law enforcement by stating:
[It is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the established
law of the land to punish a man for the commission of an offense of the
like of which he had never been guilty, either in thought or in deed, and
evidently never would have been guilty of if the officers of the law had
not inspired, incited, persuaded and lured him to attempt to commit it.
Id. at 38.
118. See JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, EVIDENCE CASES AND MATERIALS 384 (9th ed.
1999) (stating that "[elven to be acquitted may damage one's good name if the




A. Requirement of Positional Predisposition
If a person targeted and charged following a government operation
has asserted the entrapment defense, the courts have recognized the
importance of demanding that the prosecution demonstrate the defen-
dant possessed the resources required to commit the crime charged.'19
An explicit requirement of positional predisposition would demand
that the prosecution demonstrate that, prior to the government in-
ducement, the defendant was "so situated by reason of previous train-
ing or experience or occupation or acquaintances that it is likely that if
the government had not induced him to commit the crime some crimi-
nal would have done s0."120 Although it is not uniformly adopted,
some courts do take the view that the prosecution must demonstrate
positional predisposition in order to effectively dismantle an assertion
of the entrapment defense.12 1
In the Seventh Circuit Hollingsworth opinion, Judge Posner first
pointed out that Jacobson constituted a shift toward a requirement of
predisposition.122 Next, the Hollingsworth court followed what it be-
lieved the Jacobson court implicitly required and refused to uphold
the conviction of a defendant where the prosecution was unable to
demonstrate that the defendant possessed the requisite materials or
contacts to commit the crime charged. 12 3 This decision demonstrates
that the Seventh Circuit is willing to add a requirement of positional
predisposition to the burden of the prosecution.
In United States v. Poehlman,12 4 the Ninth Circuit Court ad-
dressed a case with facts nearly identical to those in Canaday.12 5 The
Poehlman opinion is especially relevant here due to the fact the Ne-
braska Supreme Court uses the Ninth Circuit position in Poehlman to
guide its own treatment of the entrapment defense. 126
119. See supra section II.D.
120. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.2d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994).
121. See McLoughlin, supra note 1, at 1073 (stating that the 7th Circuit has taken this
view).
122. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
123. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994).
124. 217 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2000).
125. The defendant in Poehlman was convicted by the trial court of crossing state lines
for the purpose of engaging in sex acts with a minor. The defendant had re-
sponded to an ad placed by the government indicating that "Sharon" was looking
for "someone who understood her family's 'unique needs.'" Id. at 695. In subse-
quent correspondence, Sharon referred to wanting a "special man teacher" for her
"sweethearts" and, as in Canaday, the defendant responded with uncertainty
about what Sharon meant. Id. at 696. However, "Poehlman finally got the hint"
and was eventually arrested upon arriving at a hotel to meet Sharon. Id. at 697.
126. After analogizing the facts of Canaday to the facts of Poehlman, see supra note
126, the Nebraska Supreme Court continued to look to Poehlman as it analyzed
the entrapment defense. See State v. Canaday, 263 Neb. 566, 584-86, 641
N.W.2d 13, 27-29 (2002).
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The Ninth Circuit opinion stated that "the relevant time frame for
assessing a defendant's disposition comes before he has any contact
with government agents, which is doubtless why it's called predisposi-
tion."127 This language demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit is recog-
nizing the inescapable problem presented by attempting to assess a
state of mind that is no longer present due to the events that occurred
between the time of interest and the time of assessment.128 Addition-
ally, the Poehlman opinion demonstrates that evidence of predisposi-
tion which carries a risk of being tainted by the accusation will be
closely scrutinized. With respect to statements made by the defen-
dant, the court made it clear that any statements made after induce-
ment will rarely constitute evidence sufficient to demonstrate
predisposition due to the possibility these statements may be tainted
by the inducement.
12 9
Upon reversal, the court stated that the record was "sparse" with
respect to evidence regarding any behavior or conduct prior to govern-
ment contact that would suggest a predisposition to commit the crime
charged. 13 0 The Ninth Circuit, like the United States Supreme Court,
reveals a desire to place importance on the "pre" in predisposition
when looking at evidence submitted with the intent of demonstrating
the presence of predisposition.13 1
Prior to the decision in Canaday, the Nebraska Supreme Court
held in State v. Heitman13 2 that the defendant was guilty of criminal
conspiracy to commit first degree sexual assault on a child after a de-
termination that the government presented enough evidence to
demonstrate predisposition.13 3 Unlike Canaday, the defendant in
Heitman did initiate contact with a minor and did so prior to any con-
tact from the government.' 34 Only after the minor alerted her em-
ployer that the contact had occurred did the police become involved.135
Heitman alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that the Nebraska
Supreme Court is looking toward any positional predisposition re-
quirement because when a defendant initiates contact prior to any
government involvement, there is not much of a positional predisposi-
127. Poehlman, 217 F.3d. at 703 (emphasis in original).
128. Although this claim that the language demonstrates recognition of these
problems may seem a bit of an attenuated assumption at first, the effect of the
language becomes more clear when considering that if the relevant time frame
for assessing disposition comes before inducement (the time of interest), then the
relevant time frame is not after inducement (the time of assessment).
129. See Poehlman, 217 F.3d at 704-05.
130. See id. at 703-04.
131. See supra text accompanying note 94.
132. 262 Neb. 185, 629 N.W.2d 542 (2001).
133. See id. at 187, 629 N.W.2d at 546.
134. Heitman gave a minor drive-through employee a sexually suggestive letter in an




tion question. 136 The comparison between Heitman and Canaday
without more is not particularly helpful because it is unlikely that all
future cases will include facts which fall neatly into the "predisposi-
tion absent" category demonstrated by Canaday (no initiation by de-
fendant, repeated and consistent inducement by government) or the
"predisposition present" category demonstrated by Heitman (defen-
dant initiated contact, government steps in later). However, when
taking the Heitman distinction into account in combination with
Canaday's reliance on Poehlman, it provides strong support for the
suggestion that the Nebraska Supreme Court is following the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits not only in recognizing the risks presented by post-
accusation assessments of predisposition, but in adopting the view
that requiring the prosecution to demonstrate positional predisposi-
tion is one way to limit these risks.
If the Nebraska Supreme Court has indeed adopted a positional
predisposition requirement, it would suggest that had the Omaha Po-
lice Department presented any evidence to the court suggesting that
even without government involvement Canaday would likely have en-
countered similar levels of suggestion and persuasion and would likely
have acted upon it, then the question of whether he was predisposed
to commit the crime would not have been an issue of such focus. If
this type of evidence was presented, Canaday would have been more
similar to Heitman and would not have generated such controversy
over whether or not the element of predisposition was demonstrated.
B. Identification of Target(s) Prior to Executing Undercover
Operations
The second shift recognizes that in designing an undercover opera-
tion, identification of the target(s) must involve some sort of narrow-
ing process. Although this shift was not expressly addressed in
Canaday, the shift toward requiring positional predisposition provides
an implicit warning to those designing undercover operations that
they must take precaution in the planning stages to ensure that the
operations target only those truly predisposed. Any design process
that allows the government operation to send out a lure that has a
large and unidentifiable target group is too broad. 137 The government
inducement must involve bait that is specifically designed to identify
136. Following Canaday, it is unlikely that there would be any question of predisposi-
tion if, as in Heitman, the government does not even become involved until after
the defendant has already demonstrated he has the resources and mental state
required to commit the crime charged.
137. Canaday himself responded to an advertisement that was "vague and open to
interpretation" under a heading of "women seeking men," which was placed in a
magazine with sexual content aimed at adults. State v. Canaday, 263 Neb. 566,
568-69, 641 N.W.2d 13, 17 (2002).
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those who would actually commit a crime, not those who would only
turn a head.
Canaday illustrates the importance of ensuring that when an oper-
ation is specifically designed to identify those persons with a predispo-
sition to commit a specific crime, the law makes certain that the bait
used is not vague and generic, but clearly designed to lure and capture
the target.' 38 If a mere nibble reveals so little about a person's dispo-
sition with respect to the nature of the crime that it becomes impossi-
ble to tell for certain whether that person would have committed the
crime in a non-manufactured setting, the bait is not properly de-
signed. By way of analogy, when a lure is tied onto a line and thrown
into a school of various species of fish, it is important for a Walleye
fisherman to know in advance that his lure is designed specifically to
catch the Walleyes. The lure must be realistic and should not have
such large hooks that it catches a fish only swimming by to view the
attractive colors. A true fisherman would not count a hook in the side
as a catch, and would throw back a Perch who mistook the Walleye
bait for something the Perch would have found more appetizing. The
law should do the same when it comes to designing undercover sting
operations.
In Canaday, the Nebraska Supreme Court appears to recognize the
importance of narrowing the group of persons who might ultimately
become caught in the trap set by the government. 139 If, as the State
contended in Canaday, simply responding to a vague 140 advertise-
ment that a reasonable man could interpret as a legitimate means to
meet a single adult woman constitutes a predisposition to sexual as-
sault on a child, the element of predisposition is so simple to demon-
strate that a successful assertion of the defense becomes virtually
impossible.
Canaday himself responded to an advertisement that was "very
vague and open to different interpretations" under a heading of "wo-
men seeking men," which was placed in a magazine with sexual con-
tent aimed at adults.141 Despite the possibility that someone
responding to this ad could have had the very legal purpose of meeting
an adult woman, Canaday's response to this advertisement is what
138. The Canaday opinion continually draws attention to Canaday's confusion regard-
ing the true desires of Lisa. See, e.g., supra note 27 and accompanying text. The
witness testimony was apparently "very vague and open to different interpreta-
tions." Canaday, 263 Neb. at 588, 641 N.W.2d at 30. The opinion's focus on
Canaday's confusion suggests that had the prosecution offered better evidence to
show that the operation was very carefully and specifically designed to target
individuals with an interest in sex with young children, the court may have been
more receptive to the prosecution's position.
139. See supra note 138.
140. See Canaday, 263 Neb. at 568-569, 641 N.W.2d at 17.
141. Canaday, 263 Neb. at 568-69, 641 N.W.2d at 17.
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made him a target and provided the lines of communication, which
ultimately led to the accusations against him. This advertisement
throws out a lure that is too vague, and a net that is too big. The
operation used contained too few safeguards to ensure that the net
has holes large enough for those who are not sufficiently disposed to
slip out before the net is pulled in. Canaday was a single man who
was hungry for companionship and was attracted by the language of
the advertisement. It is impossible to tell whether the mention of chil-
dren or the mention of a single woman sparked Canaday's interest,
but from the evidence and testimony available, it seems at least as
likely that Canaday's interest was in Lisa, not the children. If
Canaday would have independently suggested and unquestionably in-
terpreted the "special education" as involving sex with children within
the first few communications with Lisa, it would be far less likely that
the only intention of Canaday's initial response was an adult
relationship.
Although the advertisement Canaday responded to was developed
as part of an operation designed to lure those persons with a sexual
interest in children, the language of the advertisement was open to so
many different interpretations that it seems more likely that the in-
terpretation of any one person would not involve any expectation or
understanding that sexual relations with children were being insinu-
ated. Despite Officer Henthorn's testimony that the letter written to
Canaday following Canaday's initial response was worded specifically
to reach those with an interest in children, it seems that this testi-
mony is contradictory in light of the fact that Henthorn also testified
that the original advertisement that Canaday responded to was
"vague and open to different interpretations."142
It seems inconsistent and contrary to the purpose of law enforce-
ment 143 to say that Canaday was "reached" by the language of the
letter when it was Canaday's initial response to a vague advertise-
ment that actually identified him so that he could be reached at all. In
addition, the fact that the investigation into Canaday's lifestyle and
his own responses to questions from the undercover officer revealed
not only a lack of incriminating evidence, but also that Canaday had
no previous or current interest in sex with children only lends support
to the possibility that Canaday's response to the advertisement was
intended solely as a means to seek a relationship with a single adult
woman.
142. Id. at 588, 641 N.W.2d .at 30.
143. See supra note 117.
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C. Assessing the Impact of the Shift Toward Positional
Predisposition as a Requirement: Advantages and
Disadvantages
There are advantages and disadvantages to this shift in the treat-
ment of the predisposition element. A requirement that the element
of predisposition includes a showing of positional predisposition has
advantages relating to both problems discussed above with respect to
the Canaday case.
First, making positional predisposition an explicit demand on the
prosecution will provide the government with a warning regarding the
design of their operations. Requiring a demonstration of positional
predisposition most directly affects the prosecution in that their bur-
den becomes more difficult to meet.144 However, without this warn-
ing, there will likely be a mismatch between those who are caught in
the operation and those who are actually found guilty of the crime
charged. Accusing people who are eventually determined not guilty
will most definitely have an undesirable effect upon the reputation of
both law enforcement and the criminal justice system.145 If the gov-
ernment does not sufficiently identify the targeted individual or
groups and properly design the operation accordingly, it becomes pos-
sible they will accuse someone who will have a good chance of assert-
ing the entrapment defense. However, if the government knows in
advance that the trial may require proof of positional predisposition, it
will encourage more careful design in attempt to target only those who
will later be unable to demonstrate they are lacking the means needed
to commit the crime charged.1
46
A second advantage is closely related to the first. Assuming the
requirement of positional predisposition does encourage the govern-
ment to more carefully design their operations to target only those
who will be unable to successfully assert the entrapment defense.1
4 7
144. Because the traditional treatment of the entrapment defense only required the
prosecution show evidence showing mental preparedness, see supra notes 70,
111, and accompanying text, requiring the prosecution to demonstrate positional
predisposition makes this burden more difficult to meet in that it additionally
requires a showing that the defendant possessed the resources necessary to com-
mit the crime. See supra notes 108, 113, and accompanying text.
145. It seems unlikely anyone would deny that false accusations are looked upon unfa-
vorably. Additionally, the principles underlying law enforcement generally, see
supra note 117, would not be furthered by a record revealing multiple occasions of
false accusations.
146. See McLoughlin, supra note 1, at 1083 (addressing the arguments in favor of posi-
tional predisposition and stating that "a positional predisposition rule returns
entrapment analysis to its roots by limiting the arrest and punishment of non-
dangerous individuals").
147. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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This should minimize the risk of individuals being unjustly stigma-
tized by accusations that do not result in convictions.
A possible disadvantage to consider is the likelihood that the gov-
ernment and the police force will resist positional predisposition be-
coming a required part of the prosecution's case. Narrowing the
design before executing an operation and requiring more evidence to
be presented will result in an increased burden on whoever is design-
ing and executing the operation. Additionally, it is possible that the
evidence of positional predisposition could be difficult for the prosecu-
tion to obtain. This is especially true in a case of a drug charge where
the drugs could easily be disposed of prior to a search.
Despite the possible disadvantages, it seems that they are easily
overcome and are outweighed by the potential advantages. Eventu-
ally, the process of more careful design and gathering of evidence will
not be as difficult because of experience. Also, if the expected advan-
tages are obtained, then the law enforcement system will gain more
credibility due to an increased accusation-conviction ratio and a de-
creased fear of being unfairly accused.
IV. CONCLUSION
It appears that the Nebraska Supreme Court has joined other ju-
risdictions in recognizing the advantages to be gained from a shift to-
ward making positional predisposition a required part of the
prosecution's burden. Canaday did not make positional predisposition
an explicit requirement, but it undoubtedly has sent a warning to
those who execute undercover operations. The warning is sent in the
form of the court making it clear that there will be no conviction in a
case where the prosecution is unable to demonstrate the person who
was charged as a result of the operation possessed the requisite
materials and resources required to commit the crime.
Although Canaday stopped short of explicitly requiring positional
predisposition, it would not require a stretch to assume that the large
group of scholars and cases asserting that Jacobson constitutes a shift
in the way the Supreme Court of the United States treats the element
of predisposition, would also conclude that Canaday constitutes a shift
in the way that the Nebraska Supreme Court treats the element of
predisposition. If these scholars and courts are correct in their asser-
tions, the Nebraska Supreme Court is moving toward requiring posi-
tional predisposition. In light of the advantages the positional
predisposition requirement would have, the court should make this
requirement explicit at its first opportunity. An explicit predisposition
requirement should have significant effects not only on the manner in
which the prosecution structures its case against a defendant who as-
serts the entrapment defense, but also on the way that law enforce-
ment designs its undercover operations.
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